

~~ALL HOLE~~
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

~~TOP SECRET RUFF~~

Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000200010003-2

RER
GCA
LB
File (?) 34-1

TCS 15080/71
IAS 175/71
5 November 1971
Copy 6

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT : Recommendations for SALT-Related Planning by CIA

1. As the sixth SALT negotiating session is about to begin, I have reviewed the status of the negotiations and offer the following predictions for planning purposes:

a. SALT VI will at last result in draft agreements on both ABM and offensive missile limitations. Agreement may be reached by the delegations in the early spring of 1972, but it may require resolution at the summit in May.

b. As a practical matter, the deployment levels finally agreed will sharply limit or freeze the further construction of launchers for ABM's, ICBM's, and perhaps SLBM's. The agreed levels will at the least allow for completion of certain construction already underway. Additional ABM-related radar construction will probably also be allowed under agreed conditions. There will be some restraints on modernization and replacement but little or no restraints on R&D.

c. The other provisions of the agreements (e.g., verification, Standing Commission, duration and withdrawal) will be very nearly as stated in the present delegation drafts.

2. The foregoing is oversimplified and should of course be sprinkled with caveats. But if it is anywhere near right, we now know with reasonable certainty the general nature of the agreements which will result from this stage of the negotiations, and we know that next spring the focus of CIA's participation in SALT will need to shift to next steps. We should start preparing for these next steps in advance. I think we need to prepare now for monitoring Soviet compliance with the agreements, for describing our monitoring capabilities to those who must approve the agreements, and for participating in the on-going work of those who must implement the agreements.



Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000200010003-2 HANDLE VIA
TOP SECRET RUFF TALENT-KEYHOLE
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

TOP SECRET RUFF

Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000200010003-7

TCS 15080/71
IAS 175/71

SUBJECT: Recommendations for SALT-Related Planning by CIA

3. With respect to monitoring Soviet compliance, I believe we need to carry forward the work begun last spring by the DDI-ODS&T SALT Support Group (then under [redacted]) to clearly identify the requirements for collection and analysis necessary to provide satisfactory assurance that the Soviets are adhering to the agreements. This should involve, among other things, a rigorous, statistical analysis of the quantity and quality of photographic coverage the US needs to acquire during the initial period of implementation of the agreements and during their continuing life. Such an analysis should consider the degree of assurance of compliance required, the warning time needed in the event of non-compliance, and the consequences of short-falls in collection goals. The analysis can probably best be conducted under the auspices of COMIREX. I have discussed this matter with [redacted] who has at least some preliminary work under way. It should be pursued with priority. Such studies might well be initiated in the field of electronic collection as well, to cover such concerns as the matter of monitoring for changes in the characteristics of radars.

4. As to participating in implementation, there are two aspects that I think require early attention:

a. What changes, if any, in our regular analysis and presentation of data will be required by the policymaking officials who must review our continued monitoring of Soviet compliance? There may not need to be much change, because after all we have been concentrating on the relevant topics and geographic areas for some years. But, for example, there will clearly be a need for regular review of completed Soviet ICBM sites, to record and report any activities and changes, and to describe the size and nature of the sample. On this particular subject, my analysts in IAS have been working to devise appropriate analytical and reporting methods and are in the process of issuing their first reports. Other needs should be explored, probably by OSR.

b. What role should CIA (and the Intelligence community) play in relation to the US members of the US-USSR Standing Commission which the delegation drafts anticipate will be set up "to promote the objectives and implementation" of the agreements? More

LE VIA
KEYHOLE
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

~~TOP SECRET RUFF~~

Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000200010003-7

TCS 15080/71
IAS 175/71


SUBJECT: Recommendations for SALT-Related Planning by CIA

fundamentally, what do we think the role and composition of the US membership should be? How will they receive intelligence and how use it? These questions will undoubtedly be asked in due course by the Verification Panel, but I think some homework in advance would be desirable. I would suggest that the SALT Support Group under [redacted] take this on, and I propose to devote some thought to it myself in Vienna, time permitting.

25X1A

5. Describing our monitoring capabilities to those who must approve the agreements is certain to be an urgent requirement during the period of Senate (and public) discussion about approval of the agreements next year. This requirement will raise the question of how much of our intelligence sources, methods, and findings can safely be made available to contribute to the discussion, to whom, by whom, and in what forums. We should recognize that the pressures for revelation may be very great. I understand from Dr. Proctor that this general question is already being taken up at the NSC level, and my purpose here is only to emphasize the need for advance consideration by CIA as the time grows nearer.

25X1A



cc: Director, OSR
Chief, DDI-DDS&T SALT Support Group
Chairman, COMIREX

Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000200010003-7

~~TOP SECRET RUFF~~

LE VIA
KEYHOLE
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY